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1 Introduction
On the one hand network and communication protocols are complex and dif-
ﬁcult to design, on the other hand it is important that network systems are
robust and reliable. Thus it is desirable to have formal models augmented
with tools that support simulation and testing that can be used by designers
of new protocols, both in the early stages of design, as well as in later stages,
where more rigorous formal analysis is important. Rewriting logic and the lan-
guage Maude [4,9] with its support of executable speciﬁcations and its ability
to incorporate a wide spectrum of formal methods [7] is an ideal framework for
developing such tools. There is already considerable experience in modeling
and analyzing speciﬁc protocols within Maude (see [7] for a summary).
In this paper we present the speciﬁcation of a network model in Maude
and some primitives for deﬁning simulation strategies. The use of the model
is illustrated with a simple HELLO sub-protocol taken from the IETF PIM-
DM (Protocol Independent Multi-Cast-Dense Mode) RFC [6], and based on a
pseudo-code speciﬁcation [21]. The network model we present reﬂects the key
aspects of the infra-structure on which typical communication protocols run.
The model is designed so that we may execute isolated protocols as well as
develop techniques for composing sub-protocols, to model the more complex
protocols used in practice. The long term goal is to support simulation and
formal analysis at many levels of detail.
Other approaches to modeling and analysis of network protocols include:
discrete event simulation such as NS [3,13]; model checking (SPIN [11,12],
FDR [20], Murphi [5]); and using general purpose proof systems such as
PVS [18], HOL [10], or Isabelle [19]. An NS simulation runs code that can
be quite close to actual implementation using traﬃc and network topology
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generators. The result of an NS simulation is a trace of all packets produced,
transported, dropped in the network, and any other diagnostic information
directly instrumented into the protocol simulation code. The focus is on per-
formance information and there is little support for analyzing other properties
such as reliability or security properties. Verisim [1] combines NS and Java-
Mac, to allow for expressing and checking properties of the network state and
history, still based on simulation code. Model checking and theorem proving
approaches work with more expressive speciﬁcation languages, but analyse ab-
stract protocol representations. Using general purpose theorem provers allows
for reasoning about all computations and arbitrary network size and topology,
but requires considerable time and expertise to carry out the formal proofs.
Model checking is more highly automated, but for a more restricted set of
properties of speciﬁc system conﬁgurations. The SPIN model checker pro-
vides support for both simulation and model checking. Combining theorem
proving and model-checking can provide some of the beneﬁts of each. A good
example of this can be found in [2]. Our approach is based on executable
Maude speciﬁcations of network services. Maude specﬁcations are closer to
implementation code, while being simpler to reason about. They can also be
used as a step towards code generation, either using a special purpose tool or
using a Maude compiler [in progress]. On the other hand the Maude speciﬁ-
cation has a formal semantics that serves as the basis not only for analysis of
simulation results but also for reasoning both manual and automated about
general properties of a speciﬁcation and its instantiations. The current work
is a ﬁrst step towards developing ﬂexible network simulation tools. Starting
with a detailed representation of the computation chosen by a strategy we
deﬁne simpliﬁcation functions the keep information of interest, which may in-
clude selective information about packet transmission as well as information
about the ‘knowledge’ represented by the network state and diﬀerent point in
the computation. Our approach to modeling real-time properties in rewriting
logic follows that of [16], adding clocks and timers as attributes to objects
and separating the transitions modeling passage of time from those modeling
state change. Like part of the work on the Real-Time Maude tool [17] we
are developing strategies for simulation. The Real-Time Maude tool aims at
general purpose strategies for simulation and model-checking, using concepts
like eager and lazy rules, ﬁring all eager rules before time passes. Our work
is currently focused one modeling properties of network protocols. The basic
idea for our primitive strategy is to allocate ‘gas’ to each network entity, and
time passes when each entity has used up its gas or has no transitions.
2 Concurrent Objects in Rewriting Logic
We brieﬂy introduce the rewriting logic model for concurrent object systems
that we use for our network model. Following the approach of Meseguer [15],
the concurrent state of an object system, called a conﬁguration, has the struc-
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ture of a multiset made up of objects and messages. The associativity and
commutativity of a conﬁguration’s multiset structure makes it very ﬂuid. We
can think of it as a soup in which objects and messages ﬂoat, so that objects
and messages can at any time come together and participate in a concurrent
transition corresponding to a communication event of some kind.
An object in a given state is represented as a term 〈O : C | a1 : v1, . . . , an :
vn〉, where O is the object’s name or identiﬁer, C is its class, the ai’s are the
object’s attribute identiﬁers, and the vi’s are the corresponding values. The
set of all the attribute-value pairs of an object’s state is formed by repeated
application of the binary union operator , which also obeys structural laws
of associativity, commutativity, and identity; i.e., the order of the attribute-
value pairs of an object is immaterial.
Particular systems are axiomatized by providing additional operations and
equations, specifying, for example, the data operations on attribute values and
the structure of messages, and by providing rewrite rules describing the system
dynamics. These rules have the form
r(x¯) : M1 . . .Mn 〈O1 : F1 | atts1〉 . . . 〈Om : Fm | attsm〉
−→ 〈Oi1 : F ′i1 | atts ′i1〉 . . . 〈Oik : F ′ik | atts ′ik〉
〈Q1 : D1 | atts ′′1〉 . . . 〈Qp : Dp | atts ′′p〉
M ′1 . . .M
′
q
if cond
where r is the rule’s label, x¯ is a list of the variables occurring in the rule,
the Ms are message expressions, i1, . . . , ik are diﬀerent numbers among the
original 1, . . . ,m, and C is the rule’s condition. That is, a number of objects
and messages can come together and participate in a transition in which some
new objects may be created, others may be destroyed, and others can change
their state, and where some new messages may be created. We require that
there be at least one object on the left hand side.
The Full Maude language [4,9] provides special syntax, object-oriented
modules, to specify concurrent object-oriented systems. They are declared
with the syntax omod ... endom. Within an object module, classes can be
declared specifying attributes and their sorts, and subclass relations can be
declared to extend an attribute set. In addition attributes that are not used
can be omitted from the object terms in rules. Modules can be parameterized
by parameter theories. The instantiation of a parameterized module is accom-
plished by views that map the sorts and operators of parameter theories to
their corresponding instantiations in the module chosen as the actual param-
eter. Views are declared with the syntax view ... endv. View names can
then be placed in the corresponding parameters of a parameterized module
to instantiate the module. Maude provides several built in modules and the-
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ories, including the one sort parameter theory TRIV, and modules, BOOL for
booleans with sort Bool, and MACHINE-INT for integers, with sort MachineInt.
In this paper all of the views we use have the form view <Sort> from TRIV
to <MODULE> is sort Elt to <Sort> endv. Indicating that the sort Elt of
the module TRIV is mapped to the sort <Sort> of module <MODULE>. We leave
these implicit in our discussion of the Maude speciﬁcation.
3 The Network Model
A network as modeled in Maude consists of a set of nodes, interfaces, and
local area networks (lans), each being a Maude object of the appropriate
class. Since failure, and the ability to recover from such failure is central to
network protocols, each type of object: node, lan, and interface has a boolean
ﬂag to indicate its status (up or down). An interface connects one node to one
lan and has two buﬀers, one for outgoing packets (node to lan) and one for
incoming packets (lan to node). A node also has a pair of buﬀers for each of its
interfaces. These can be thought of as the other half of the interfaces buﬀers.
This split is done to allow uniform and distributed movement of packets from
node to interface to lan and back. It also means that node speciﬁc rules for
processing packets can be expressed completely locally – using only the nodes
local state. There are generic network rules for moving packets around and for
modeling failure/crash of nodes, interfaces, and lans, and for reset of interfaces
and lans. Node reset is speciﬁc to the node subclass.
3.1 Packets
A network packet has at least a destination address, a packet type, contents,
and a source address. The destination address could be that of an interface,
or a pseudo address such as a multicast address. The constant lanAddress is
introduced to serve as a lan broadcast address.
(fmod PACKET is
including CONFIGURATION .
sorts Packet Contents PType Address .
subsort Oid < Address .
op mkPacket : Address PType Contents Address -> Packet .
op lanAddress : -> Address .
endfm)
3.2 Interface buﬀers and plugs
We use two additional structures to assist in representing nodes. These struc-
tures are needed to represent interface connections from a nodes point of
view (InterfaceBuffer) and from a lans point of view (InterfacePlug). An
InterfaceBuffer is the pair of buﬀers together with the name (identiﬁer)
of the interface. The buﬀers are modeled as lists of packets using the pa-
rameterized LIST module instantiated with the Packet view. As mentioned
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above, all our views have the same form and are omitted here for brevity. The
InterfacePlug is the name of the interface together with a ﬂag. The ﬂag
in this case is used in the rules to indicate whether or not a packet on the
lan wire has been seen by an interface. The module also contains operations
clear that clear, or reset, these structures. Clearing an InterfaceBuffer
resets each of its buﬀers to the empty one, while clearing an InterfacePlug
resets its ﬂag to false. For brevity we omit the equations describing clear.
(fmod INTERFACES is
including CONFIGURATION . including BOOL . including LIST[Packet] .
sorts InterfaceBuffer InterfacePlug .
op mkInterfaceBuffer : Oid List[Packet] List[Packet] -> InterfaceBuffer .
op mkInterfacePlug : Oid Bool -> InterfacePlug .
op clear : InterfaceBuffer -> InterfaceBuffer .
op clear : InterfacePlug -> InterfacePlug .
**** equations for clear omitted.
endfm)
3.3 Networks
Then the NETWORK object module is introduced which deﬁnes the classes Node,
Interface, and Lan and the generic operations and rules for networks. An
Interface object consists of its status ﬂag, a lan object identiﬁer, a node
object identiﬁer, and the two unidirectional buﬀers. A Node object consists
of its status ﬂag, and a list of InterfaceBuffer. A Lan object consists of its
status ﬂag, a wire that may or may not contain a packet (the one currently
traveling on the lan), and a list of interfaces that are attached to the lan. This
is in the form of a list of InterfacePlugs. The DEFAULT parameterized module
its parameter sort with a distinguished constant to represent an undeﬁned or
non-existent element.
(omod NETWORK is
protecting BOOL . protecting MACHINE-INT .
protecting INTERFACES . including PACKET .
protecting LIST[Packet] . protecting DEFAULT[Packet] .
protecting LIST[InterfaceBuffer] . protecting LIST[InterfacePlug] .
class Interface | up : Bool, lan : Oid, node : Oid,
n2l : List[Packet], l2n : List[Packet] .
class Node | up : Bool, interfaces : List[InterfaceBuffer] .
class Lan | up : Bool, wire : Default[Packet],
interfaces : List[InterfacePlug] .
The object module also contains four operations necessary for formulating
the rewrite rules. The operation iCast constructs a packet addressed to the
lan broadcast address lanAddress of the given type and contents on the out-
going buﬀer of each of the given interfaces with packet source the particular
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interface associated with the buﬀer. clear is the extension of the reset opera-
tions mentioned above to lists of InterfacePlugs and lists InterfaceBuffers
respectively. Finally, the predicate allTrue is used to determine if every
InterfacePlug in a list has seen the packet currently on the lan’s wire. In
other words if every InterfacePlug ﬂag is set to true.
op iCast : PType Contents List[InterfaceBuffer] -> List[InterfaceBuffer] .
op clear : List[InterfaceBuffer] -> List[InterfaceBuffer] .
op clear : List[InterfacePlug] -> List[InterfacePlug] .
op allTrue : List[InterfacePlug] -> Bool .
*** equations and conditional equations omitted for brevity
The rewrite rules form several groups. There are rules that allow any
interface icrash, node ncrash or lan object to crash lcrash, and there are
rules that allow any interface ireset or lan object lreset to recover (reset)
from a crash. The rules for the crashing of an interface or lan are generic,
as are their reset rules. The crash rules set the up attribute to false, while
the reset rules set it to true. In addition, reset rules give the other attributes
default initial values clearing wires and buﬀers. The node rules however will
be part of a particular protocol. Thus there will be speciﬁc reset/reboot rules
for each subclass of node, representing the protocol at that node.
Independent of the protocol are the rules for propagating packets around
the network. Examples of this are rules that move a packet from the appropri-
ate interface to the corresponding buﬀer on the node i2n and n2i, a similar
transfer going in the other direction. Packet ﬂows from the interface to the
lan via i2l, and from the wire of the lan to the interfaces on the lan via a pair
of rules. l2i-on puts the packet in the appropriate interface buﬀer when the
interface is up (not removing the packet from the wire). It ignores interfaces
that are not up, though it does record the fact that they have been considered
for this packet (by using the ﬂag of the InterfacePlug, and ﬁnally a rule,
clear, to remove the packet from the lan wire after its has been propagated
to every up interface, and dropped for every down interface on the lan.
3.4 Time and Timers
To handle the use of timers uniformly a class of timer objects is deﬁned and
a timerset attribute is added to nodes that contains the nodes current set of
timers. First TIME and TIMER modules are introduced. For simplicity and
executability, Time is modeled by MachineInt:
(fth TIME is
protecting BOOL . protecting MACHINE-INT .
sort Time .
subsort MachineInt < Time .
endfth)
Note that, following [16], all that is required of a TIME module is a sort
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Time, a constant 0, and operations +, -, and < satisfying certain basic prop-
erties, and it is straightforward make this parametric.
A timer is an object with a boolean attribute on that indicates whether
the timer is running, and a attribute time which when running gives the time
left. Passage of time is modeled by the delta operation that decrements the
time attribute of a timer that is on.
(omod TIMER is
including BOOL . including TIME .
class Timer | on : Bool, time : Time .
op delta : Object Time -> Object .
var xid : Oid . vars xTime0 xTime1 : Time .
eq delta(< xid : Timer | on : true, time : xTime0 >, xTime1) =
< xid : Timer | on : true,
time : (if (xTime0 < xTime1) then 0 else xTime0 - xTime1) > .
eq delta(< xid : Timer | on : false, time : xTime0 >, xTime1) =
< xid : Timer | on : false, time : xTime0 > .
endom)
3.5 Timed Networks
The TIMED-NETWORK module introduces TimedNodes which extend the Node
class by incorporating a clock clock representing the current local time, and
a set of timers timerSet. We also incorporate into the TIMED-NETWORKmodule
an ability to create new identiﬁers and new timers by the operations newId
and newTimer. The attribute idcounter is used to create a fresh identiﬁer
for each new timer object.
(omod TIMED-NETWORK is
including NETWORK . including TIMER . including SET[Object] .
class TimedNode | idcounter : MachineInt,
clock : Time,
timerSet : Set[Object] .
subclass TimedNode < Node .
op newId : Oid MachineInt -> Oid .
op newTimer : Oid MachineInt Bool Time -> Object .
A System sort in a TIMED-NETWORKmodule is a wrapper around a Configuration.
Following the approach of [16], the passage of time is given by lifting the delta
operation on timer objects, to corresponding operations on sets of objects, and
Configurations.
Finally the predicate noTimeOuts is introduced. noTimeOuts is true of a
conﬁguration, or set of objects, if there is no running timer whose time has
run out (i.e. reached 0).
sort System .
op mkSys : Configuration -> System .
op delta : Set[Object] Time -> Set[Object] .
op delta : Configuration Time -> Configuration .
op noTimeOuts : Configuration -> Bool .
7
Mason–Talcott
op noTimeOuts : Set[Object] -> Bool .
**** equations concerning operations omitted.
4 The PIMDM Hello example
The neighbors of a network node are those nodes that are connected to one
of the lan’s to which the given node is connected. Since nodes may go of-
ﬂine, and new nodes may connect, this is a dynamically changing set. The
Hello sub-protocol of the PIM-DM protocol is used to determine the current
neighbor nodes. Each node periodically broadcasts a hello message on each
lan to which it is connected. When a hello message is received, the sender
is added to the list of neighbors and an associated timer is set. If the timer
times out before another hello message is received the neigbor is assumed
to be disconnected and is removed from the neighbors list. If the timeout
interval and the resend interval are suitably tuned to the network conditions,
then after some initial startup period each node will have a reasonably good
approximation of its set of neighbors.
The HELLO object module introduces the Hello-Node class and gives the
rules for processing hello messages and timeouts. A Hello-Node extends the
TimedNode class by incorporating several collections of timer objects. Each
Hello-Node has a single helloTimer, as well as a timer for each of its neigh-
bor nodes on the network. The timers being objects, are usually referred to
by their identiﬁers. Thus the helloTimer attribute is actually an object iden-
tiﬁer. The neighbor timers, or more accurately their identiﬁers, are kept in a
list, while the identiﬁers of the neighbor nodes are kept in a separate list. The
association of timer (identiﬁer) with neighbor node is by the position in the
list. Thus the ith timer in the timer list corresponds to the i neighbor node
in the node list. The node stores all the actual timer objects in the timerSet
attribute provided by the TimedNode superclass.
The protocol makes use of hello packets, and two time constants helloTimeOut,
and helloTime. The helloTimeOut is the time a node waits before it decides
to remove it from its current neighbor list, while the helloTime is the time
between its multicasting of hello packets. Thus if helloTimeOut is substan-
tially larger than helloTime a node can safely assume that it is justiﬁed in
removing a neighbor when the associated timer goes oﬀ.
(omod HELLO is
including TIMED-NETWORK . including LIST[Oid] . including SET[Object] .
class Hello-Node | helloTimer : Oid,
neighborTimers : List[Oid], neighbors : List[Oid] .
subclass Hello-Node < TimedNode .
subsort Oid < Address . subsort Time < Contents .
op hello : -> PType .
op helloTimeOut : -> Time . eq helloTimeOut = 105 .
op helloTime : -> Time . eq helloTime = 30 .
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4.1 The Hello-Node reset
The ﬁrst important rule is the reset rule for Hello-Node, a reset for a hello
node does three things: (1) the node clears both it’s neighbor lists (i.e sets
both neighborTimers and neighbors to be empty); (2) it throws out any
neighbor timers, leaving only its helloTimer, which is reset to helloTime;
(3) it then broadcasts a hello packet with contents helloTimeOut on all its
interfaces, using the iCast operation.
rl [nreset] :
< xid : Hello-Node | up : false, interfaces : xNIL, helloTimer : xidHT,
neighborTimers : xNTL, neighbors : xNL,
timerSet : xTS U < xidHT : Timer | on : xBool, time : xT> >
xConf
=>
< xid : Hello-Node | up : true, helloTimer : xidHT ,
interfaces : iCast(hello, helloTimeOut, xNIL) ,
neighborTimers : nil, neighbors : nil,
timerSet : < xidHT : Timer | on : true, time : helloTime > >
xConf .
4.2 The incoming hello packet rule
If a Hello-Node receives an incoming hello message on one of its interfaces,
it does one of two things: (1) if it already has a timer associated with the
neighbor, then it simply resets that timer to the contents of the hello, which
is the value of helloTimeOut for the sender; (2) if it doen’t have a timer,
then it creates a new timer associated with this neighbor (via the two lists
neighborTimers and neighbors) and adds this timer to the timer set, incre-
menting the idcounter appropriately.
This complex rule makes use of three operations HelloOnNeighbors, HelloOnTimers,
and HelloOnTimerSets which we omit due to space considerations.
rl [nhello] :
< xid : Hello-Node | up : true, idcounter : k, helloTimer : xidHT,
interfaces : xNIL1 @ mkInterfaceBuffer(
xidN,
mkPacket(lanAddress,hello,xHelloTime,xidI) @ xinQ,
xoutQ) @ xNIL2,
neighborTimers : xNTL, neighbors : xNL, timerSet : xTS >
xConf
=>
< xid : Hello-Node | up : true,
idcounter : if ( length(xNL) == length(HelloOnNeighbors(xidI,xNL)) )
then k else ( k + 1 ) fi,
interfaces : xNIL1 @ mkInterfaceBuffer(xidN, xinQ ,xoutQ) @ xNIL2 ,
helloTimer : xidHT,
neighborTimers : HelloOnTimers(xidI,xNL,xNTL,xid,k) ,
neighbors : HelloOnNeighbors(xidI,xNL) ,
timerSet : HelloOnTimerSet(xidI,xHelloTime,xNL,xNTL,xid,k,xTS) >
xConf .
9
Mason–Talcott
4.3 The Timeout rules
The remaining two rules concerning the protocol correspond to when either
of the two types of timers timeout. When the HelloTimer times out the
node merely resets the helloTimer (to helloTime), and then broadcasts a
hello packet with contents helloTimeOut on all its interfaces, using the iCast
operation.
rl [nhelloTimeOut] :
< xid : Hello-Node | up : true, helloTimer : xidT, interfaces : xNIL,
neighborTimers : xNTL, neighbors : xNL,
timerSet : xTS U < xidT : Timer | on : true, time : 0 > >
xConf
=>
< xid : Hello-Node | up : true, helloTimer : xidT ,
interfaces : iCast(hello,helloTimeOut,xNIL) ,
neighborTimers : xNTL, neighbors : xNL,
timerSet : xTS U <xidT : Timer | on : true, time : helloTime > >
xConf .
If a neighbor timer times out, then that neigbour is ﬂushed from both
neighbor lists, as is its timer from the timer set.
crl [nNeighborTimeout] :
< xid : Hello-Node | up : true, helloTimer : xidT, interfaces : xNIL,
neighborTimers : xNTLa @ xidNT @ xNTLd,
neighbors : xNLa @ xidN @ xNLd,
timerSet : xTS U < xidNT : Timer | on : true, time : 0 > >
xConf
=>
< xid : Hello-Node | up : true, interfaces : xNIL, helloTimer : xidT ,
neighborTimers : xNTLa @ xNTLd,
neighbors : xNLa @ xNLd,
timerSet : xTS >
xConf
if not( < xidNT : Timer | on : true, time : 0 > in xTS) .
4.4 The passage of time
Finally the rules for the passage of time are added. The ctick rule is con-
ditional on there being no timeouts in the system. Thus time outs must be
acted upon before time can be allowed to pass. The tick rule allows time to
pass unconditionally. Application of either of these rules must be controlled
by network simulation strategies that provide a value for the time variable
xTime.
crl [ctick] : mkSys(xConf) => mkSys(delta(xConf,xTime)) if noTimeOuts(xConf) .
rl [tick] : mkSys(xConf) => mkSys(delta(xConf,xTime)) .
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5 Network Simulation Strategy Primitives
The simplest way to test a network protocol is to deﬁne the initial conﬁg-
urations of interest (network topology and initial protocol parameters) and
execute these using Maude’s default execution strategy. This already gives
some information about the protocol and particularly about your speciﬁca-
tion. However, this does not account for all the other possible executions
due to diﬀerent choices in which rewrite rule to apply at each given stage.
By choosing diﬀerent execution strategy’s for Maude one can model a range
of diﬀerent network conditions and rates that diﬀerent nodes might progress
without changing the underlying speciﬁcation.
Using Maude’s reﬂective capability, such strategies can be readily deﬁned
and executed in Maude. As a ﬁrst step in developing a simulation tool, we
have deﬁned a small set of primitives for simulation of networks based on
our Timed-Network model. The basic problem is to ﬁgure out what and how
much to do between applications of the tick rule that advances time. Our
primitives have been designed to make this decision programmable and allow
the designer to experiment with diﬀerent choices.
We extend Maude’s META-LEVEL module, a functional module that pro-
vides syntax and operations for representation and manipulation of modules,
terms, and sort relations, as well as basic rewriting primitives: meta-reduce
(for equational rewriting); meta-apply (for controlled application of speciﬁc
rewrite rules); and meta-rewrite (for using the default execution strategy).
In object conﬁgurations we are interested in controlling the application of
rewrite rules based on the objects involved in order insure that each object is
allocated a fair share of cycles. We deﬁne the function
op cast : Term -> Set[Term] .
which given the representation of an object conﬁguration returns the set of
(representations of) object identiﬁers of that conﬁguration. To control the
number of rewrites for a given object we deﬁne a sort OwG (Object with Gas)
and constructor
op wGas : Term MachineInt -> OwG .
where wGas(oidT,nGas) indicates that the object with identity given by oidT
has gas allocation nGas (can participate in nGas rule applications.)
We restrict attention to object modules in which each rule involves at
least one object and consider only conﬁgurations in which each object has
a unique identity. Thus the identities of the objects involved uniquely de-
termine the matching substitution for a rule application. In the case of our
network model there is, for each rule, a principle object that determines the
match, even though some rules involve more than one object (interface-lan,
and interface-node rules). Thus we introduce the sort RuleScheme consisting
of pairs rs(rid,vid) where rid is a rule identiﬁer and vid is the variable
appearing in the rule that names the principle object. A rule instance is
a pair ri(rs(rid,vid),oidT) consisting of a rule scheme and an object id
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(representation) giving the match for vid.
The operations Enabled and Fire are the basic operations for deﬁning
strategies for object conﬁgurations.
op Enabled : Module Term Term RuleScheme -> Bool .
op Fire : Module Term Term RuleScheme -> Term .
Enabled(M, cfT, oidT, rs(rid, vid) ) tests whether, in the module M,
the rule instance ri(rs(rid,vid),oidT) is enabled in the conﬁguration cfT.
If so, Fire(M, cfT, oidT, rs(rid, vid) ) is the result of ﬁring (applying)
the above rule instance. (Note that enableness and ﬁring are also the primitive
notions used to deﬁne notions of fairness in such object systems.)
We use a sort Path to represent information of interest extracted from a
Maude computation. For example path(steps,cfT) is a path where steps is
the sequence of rule instances applied and cfT is the ﬁnal conﬁguration. This
form of path is just one possible choice. More information could be kept, the
ﬁnal conﬁguration could be further abstracted, and so on according what is
most useful.
Using these basic primitives we deﬁne a simple strategy for bounded ap-
plication of rules.
op tryObs : Module List[RuleScheme] Set[OwG] Set[OwG] Bool Path -> Path .
Working in module M with initial conﬁguratin cfT, tryObs(M, rsL, OwGs,
mt, false, path(nil,cfT)) applies the rule schemes in the list rsL decre-
menting allotted gas for the principle object of each rule application and re-
membering the sequence of rule instances, until nothing more can be done —
either no more rules are enabled, or all of the objects are out of gas. This
is done by repeatedly mapping through the set of objects, OwGs, looking for
a rule enabled for that object and applying it if one is found. The second
set of objects-with-gas is used to keep those that still have gas left and the
boolean is used to remember if any rule has ﬁred. The path argument is used
to remember the rule instances ﬁred and the current conﬁguration.
This strategy can be used for any object module meeting our requirment
that each rule involves at least one object and each rule has a principle object.
The notion of rule scheme can easily be generalised to allow for a list of
variables to match ids in the case that there are several objects with no one
of them uniquely determining a matching substitution. We have used this
strategy to run to run test simulations of the HELLO protocol.
In a timed object module, the tryObs strategy deals with what happens
between ticks. To control the passing of time and the interleaving of ticks
and other rules we deﬁne Tick, that applies the tick rule once, round that
applies the tryObs strategy and then the Tick strategy, and ﬁnally rounds
the iterates round some ﬁnite number of times.
op Tick : Module RuleScheme MachineInt Path -> Path .
op round : Module List[RuleScheme] NzMachineInt RuleScheme MachineInt Path
-> Path .
op rounds :
Module List[RuleScheme] NzMachineInt RuleScheme MachineInt MachineInt Path
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-> Path .
Tick(M,rs(rid,vid),nTime, path(steps, cfT)) is the result of apply-
ing the tick rule, rid, of timed module M with nTime as the value of the time
variable, vid. round(M, rsL, nGas, rs(rid,vid), nTime, path(steps,cfT))
ﬁrst applies tryObs with rule-scheme list rsL and initial object-with-gas set
obtained by computing the cast of cfT and allocating each object initial
amount of gas, nGas. It then applies Tick to the resulting path, with tick rule
rs(rid,vid) and time increment nTime. rounds(M, rsL, nGas, rs(rid,vid),
nTime, nRounds, path(steps,cfT)) repeats round, nRounds times and re-
turns the resulting path. This is a very simple strategy, but eﬀective for sim-
ulating network conﬁgurations as we will indicate in the next section. Again
it can easily be elaborated with mechanisms for assigning diﬀerent amounts
of gas to diﬀerent classes of objects, or for prioritizing the list of rules.
As a ﬁrst simple example, consider a network with one lan and three nodes
connected to it, each by a single interface. Let rsL be the list of generic node
rule schemes (omitting crash and reset) appended to the list of hello rule
schemes. Then with nGas 5 and nTime 10 each node knows its neighbors after
2 rounds, but with nGas 2 it takes three rounds for this to be accomplished.
To allow for runtime adjustment of the timer settings we deﬁned a func-
tion setHT such that setHT(M, sendT, holdT) adds equations deﬁning the
constants of a HELLO module representing the interval to wait before sending
a hello message to be sendT, and deﬁning the time to wait for a next hello
from a given neighbor to be holdT.
Now we can experiment with diﬀerent choices of initial conﬁguration, timer
settings, amount of work between ticks, and and speed (all times being relative
to a choice of unit). The function
harounds(sendT,holdT, nGas,nTime,nRounds, hcfT)
starts with initial conﬁguration hcfT of Hello nodes, interfaces and lans, work-
ing in a HELLO module, setHT(HELLO-TEST,sendT,holdT), with timer set-
tings given by sendT and holdT. It executes for nRounds, allowing each entity
nGas rewrites and advancing the clock by nTime after each round. (In fact
the round function was modiﬁed to ﬁre enabled rule instances dealing with
timeouts until none remain, not counting these in the gas allotment, then
considering the remaining rules as described above.)
To test the ideas, we considered three inital conﬁgurations, looking for
situations in which a neighbor timer expires, and for situations in which a
node does get to know all of its neighbors in the time of the run. The three
conﬁgurations are:
• Hnet3 — the 3 node network described above
• Hnet6 — a network with 6 Hello nodes, one lan, with each node having one
interface connection to the lan.
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• Hnet33 — a network with 5 Hello nodes and 2 lans. 3 nodes are connected
to each lan with one of the nodes be connected to both lans.
We ﬁxed the send interval sendT to be 10 and considered values of holdT
ranging from 10 to 20. (The PIM-DM RFC proposes 30 and 105 respectively.
The longer holdtime makes no diﬀerence in the absence of other network
traﬃc.)
In the Hnet3 case the following experiments were performed:
sendT holdT nGas nTime nRounds NTO? Know?
1. 10 15 2 2 15 no yes
2. 10 11 2 2 10 no yes
3. 10 15 1 2 10 no yes
4. 10 15 5 2 15 no yes
5. 10 10 2 2 10 yes yes
The ﬁrst ﬁve columns are labeled by the parameters to the run, the NTO?
column records whether or not there were neighbor timeouts, and the Know?
column records whether or not all Hello nodes came to know their neighbors.
In each of these runs, every Hello node came to know its 2 neighbors and only
in the holdT 10 case did a neighbor timeout occur.
In the Hnet33 case the following experiments were performed:
sendT holdT nGas nTimenRounds NTO? Know?
1. 10 15 2 2 15 no yes
2. 10 15 6 3 15 no yes
3. 10 15 1 3 15 yes no
In the ﬁrst two runs, every Hello-node comes to know its neighbors (two for
the nodes connected to one lan and 4 for the node connected to two lans) and
no neighbor timeouts occur. In the last run (with 1 unit of gas per round,
corresponding to a slow network) neighbors become known then timeout due
to the slow transmission and processing of packets. Nodes do not come to
know all their neighbors at once.
In the Hnet6 case the following experiments were performed:
sendTholdT nGas nTime nRounds NTO? Know?
1. 10 20 5 5 10 no no
2. 10 15 2 2 10 no no
3. 10 15 2 2 20 no no
4. 10 15 1 2 20 no no
5. 10 15 6 2 20 no yes
6. 10 12 6 4 10 yes no
This is perhaps the most interesting case. Giving the timing granularity, six
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nodes on a lan causes congestion and it requires faster processing for the Hello
protocol to stabilize. In the ﬁrst three cases there are no neighbor timeouts
and only one node gets to know all ﬁve of its neighbors at once. The rest
come to know at most four at once. In the fourth case, again there are no
neighbor timeouts, but nodes come to know fewer neighbors at once. In the
ﬁfth case all nodes come to know all their neighbors and there are no neighbor
timeouts. In the sixth case, there are neighbor timesouts, but there are also
times when all nodes know all their neighbors.
The above experiments illustrate how our simulation primitives can be used
to study the relation between timer settings, network/processor speed, and
network load. Much work work remains, to reﬁne the primitives and ensure
that the abstractions provide an adequate model of the network properties
of interest. For example, reﬁning the way gas is assigned would allow us to
control the lan, interface, and node speeds independently. However, the initial
results are encouraging, in that starting with the basic simulation primitives it
is fairly easy to modify them and to carry out the simulations. The 20 round
simulations of the 6 node network were the most complex and these took at
most a few minutes to run.
The Maude code for the timed network and strategy modules will be made
available on the Maude website (http://maude.csl.sri.com) soon, along
with the HELLO protocol, example runs and additional PIM-DM protocol
modules as they are developed.
6 Future Work
The work presented in this paper is the starting point for a number of research
directions. The ﬁrst task is to ﬁnish the speciﬁcation of the PIM-DM protocol,
and carry out a variety of analyses. This was the original motivating example.
There are two interesting challenges here. One is to make clear, in some
systematic way, the connection between the Maude speciﬁcation and both the
pseudo-code speciﬁcation [21] that was our starting point, and the IETF RFC
for PIM-DM, which was the starting point of the pseudo-code speciﬁcation.
This is important both as a means of validating the Maude speciﬁcation, and as
means of making the Maude speciﬁcation understandable to protocol designers
and implementors that are more familiar with these informal speciﬁcations.
It is also important because the informal speciﬁcation in the form of RFCs
captures intuitions and requirements that are not so easy to formalize, but
are essential to the correct understanding. A second challenge is to factor the
full PIM-DM speciﬁcation into sub-protocols, each dealing with a particular
sub-task (the HELLO protocol being an easy example, but there are others for
pruning the multicast tree and for grafting new subtrees, for example). The
idea being to be able to analyze and test each sub-protocol independently, as
well as to compose and analyze the composite. One beneﬁt of this approach
is that sub-protocols can then be reused elsewhere or replaced by alternative
15
Mason–Talcott
with greater ease and assurance. Another potential beneﬁt is to be able to use
results from analysis of the sub-protocols to simplify analysis and testing of
composites. A similar case study specifying an adaptive multicast congestion
control protocol as the composition of reusable sub-protocols is currently in
progress [14].
Going beyond PIM-DM we need to look at other protocols, dealing with
diﬀerent aspects of network communication – for example group communica-
tion, security and fault-tolerance.
Another direction of research is to develop a richer collection of simulation
strategies and analyses. Going beyond the basic timed network model we
need to consider how to deal with probablistic issues both from the point of
view of speciﬁcation of properties and for purposes of more comprehensive
simulation strategies. A ﬁrst step is to investigate the use of the Real-Time
Maude tool [17], for model checking of simple temporal properties.
Protocols in a particular domain, for example security or routing, are of-
ten speciﬁed with a style or domain speciﬁc notation that is quite systematic.
Millen has made good use of this observation in the case of cryptographic com-
munication protocols and formalized the notation in the language CAPSL [8].
The formalization makes implicit assumptions explicit and allows for execution
and formal analysis of protocols speciﬁed in CAPSL. An interesting question
is whether notations can be found for other domains that are easy for proto-
col designers to use but at the same time can be given a formal executable
semantics.
Finally, an important challenge is to abstract from speciﬁc case studies in-
volving composition of protocols and develop generic composition mechanisms
that can be expressed as module operations in Maude.
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